US nuclear policy

In the media anticipation of and then excitement at a general election in the UK, it may have been easy to have missed a potentially significant change in US policy. The new policy on the use of nuclear weapons rules out their deployment against non-nuclear nations, even if the threat posed or attack made involves biological or chemical weapons - unless the security of America or its allies is put at 'fundamental' risk. Quite what that amounts to is not immediately clear, but the ruling out of nuclear retaliation against biological or chemical (or cyber) attack from a non-nuclear nation marks a distinct break from Bush. For a report see:

http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15867948

The changed policy has a more subtle importance. See:

http://robertpaulwolff.blogspot.com/2010/04/what-really-matters.html

The separation in status of biological and chemical weapons from nuclear weapons is clearly implied by the policy. Why think this is so important? Well, with the advent of nuclear weapons, the concept of a weapon of mass destruction gets introduced to mark the enormity of their destructive capacity in relation to other kinds of weapons. Yet, when we think back to 2002-2003 and the invasion of Iraq, we find biological and chemical weapons falling within the scope of WMD. Saddam was known not to have nuclear weapons. For all their wicked effect, there is little real reason to regard biological or chemical weapons as instruments of mass destruction. By separating the way in which today’s defence doctrine regards these different types of weapon, the change in nuclear policy points to the profound dishonesty of the case made for the invasion.